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NOTE
Barker v. Morris and the Right?
to Confrontation
I. Introduction
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."' This short clause has been the subject of spirited debate over the
interests it protects and the procedures it mandates.2 A long line of
Supreme Court decisions demonstrates that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees a criminal defendant more than a showing that testimony
sought to be used against him is "reliable." The Court has held repeat-
edly that cross-examination is the primary protection advanced by the
Confrontation Clause, and is generally necessary to further a complete
and fair development of the facts.3 Interpreted literally, the Confronta-
tion Clause would preclude any testimony by an out of court witness
offered by the prosecution against a criminal defendant.
The Supreme Court, however, has never interpreted the Confronta-
tion Clause as an absolute ban on the use of hearsay.4 The Court has
long recognized the admissibility of several types of extrajudicial state-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See, eg., F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 106-07 (1951) (discussing the defend-
ants right to present witnesses); 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974) (The main purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of
cross examination.); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980) (setting forth the basic con-
tours of the debate); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("the Confrontation Clause... reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce
any available witness" (emphasis in original)); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (The historical analysis of the clause does not provide a useful guide to
adjudication of current confrontation clause issues.).
3. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court,
however, has permitted the admission of hearsay which qualifies as a dying declaration or
former testimony. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
4. Comment, Constitutional Law-Confrontation Clause-Admission at Trial of Slain In-
formant's Prior Grand Jury Testimony Against Defendants Does Not Violate Confrontation
Guarantee Despite Lack of Cross-Examination, 31 VAND. L. REv. 682, 685 (1978) [hereinafter
Comment, Constitutional Law].
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ments that fall under exceptions to the hearsay rule.' With the recent
development of state evidence codes, and the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Court has altered its confrontation clause
analysis to comport with the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.6
In Ohio v. Roberts7 the Court attempted to formulate a practical stan-
dard for deciding when the admission at trial of out of court testimony
will not violate the confrontation guarantee. 8 However, the federal cir-
cuit courts have been unable to generate a consistent confrontation clause
theory under the Roberts analysis.9
The case of Barker v. Morris1" illustrates the difficulty the lower
courts have experienced in adopting a consistent confrontation clause
analysis." In Barker, a unanimous court employed a case-by-case ap-
proach to alleged confrontation clause violations that ultimately hinges
on a particular court's sense of fairness. This approach converts the
Confrontation Clause into a mere rule of preference, nullifying its consti-
tutional protections to criminal defendants.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's failure to set forth a stan-
dard to determine when the admission of hearsay will pass muster under
the Confrontation Clause. Part I presents Barker v. Morris as an exam-
ple of a confrontation problem that challenges a court to decide the ques-
tion of admissibility without the benefit of precise guidelines. Part II
summarizes the evolution and decline of the Confrontation Clause as a
guarantor of a fair trial, and examines the landmark case of Ohio v. Rob-
5. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (recognizing dying decla-
rations); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (recognizing the admissibility of
a witness' former trial testimony).
6. See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
8. The Court set forth a two-prong test for determining when the admission into evi-
dence of hearsay will not violate the Confrontation Clause: (1) the prosecutor must show that
the witness is unavailable, and (2) the evidence must possess sufficient indicia of reliability. Id.
at 65. See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
9. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-33, 800-34 nn.47-48
(M. Bender 1985) and cases cited therein. This inconsistency is demonstrated in cases involv-
ing the testimony of grand jury witnesses who are unavailable at time of trial. See infra notes
121-126 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Admissibility of Unavailable Witness
Grand Jury Testimony: Upholding The Purposes Behind the Confrontation Clause, 18 VAL.
U.L. REV. 965 (1984); Comment, Constitutional Law, supra note 4; Case Comment, Evi-
dence-Const. Law-The Confrontation Clause and the Catch-All Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 17 LAND & WATER L. REv. 703 (1982). The inconsistency can also be seen in circuit
court decisions applying the second prong of the Roberts test. The second prong concerns the
reliability of out-of-court testimony. Some circuits hold that if an out-of-court statement falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause is automatically satisfied.
Other circuits analyze each statement on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the state-
ment is sufficiently trustworthy. This split between the circuits is discussed infra notes 115-127
and accompanying text.
10. 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 814 (1986).
11. See infra notes 128-165 and accompanying text.
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erts and its inconsistent application by the circuit courts. Part III focuses
on the inadequacies of Roberts, including the strained, result-oriented de-
cisions Roberts has generated. Part IV discusses various proposals for
handling confrontation clause and hearsay rule clashes. This Note con-
cludes that Ohio v. Roberts sanctioned a subjective approach to determin-
ing whether the admission of hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause,
resulting in a series of inconsistent and arbitrary decisions. The Supreme
Court needs to reexamine this area to insure that the protections guaran-
teed by the Confrontation Clause will not become an empty promise.
I. Barker v. Morris
A. The Facts
In 1971, after a meeting at the Hell's Angels' clubhouse in Rich-
mond, California, two men died. A number of people were present at the
time, including the defendant Richard Barker (a.k.a. "Rotten Richard"),
the club president, and "Whispering Bill" Pifer, a Hell's Angels member
who later became a government informant.' 2 Also present were William
Moran, Chester Green, "Junior" Carter, "Badger" Mumm, Rollin Crane
and Pifer's sixteen year old son, Bill Pifer, Jr. 3
In March 1972, Bill Pifer, who was suffering from throat cancer,
approached the police and offered to help solve a double homicide in
exchange for complete immunity from prosecution for a wide range of
state and federal crimes, and for a guarantee that his son would not be
charged in the homicides. Pifer then supplied information which re-
sulted in the prosecution of Moran, Green, Carter, and Mumm in late
1972.14 Barker and Crane, who were also indicted, had left the state
prior to the indictments and were not present at the preliminary hearing
for Moran and three other defendants.1 5
Pifer testified at the preliminary hearing regarding the homicides.
The state trial court permitted Pifer's entire testimony to be videotaped
because he was expected to live only a few weeks. Defense counsel's
cross-examinations of Pifer was also videotaped. No attorney repre-
sented Barker at this hearing. Moran was bound over for trial; soon after
Moran's trial began, Pifer died.16
Barker was arrested in Michigan two years after his indictment and
was brought to trial almost two years after Pifer's death. At his trial, the
prosecution introduced Pifer's videotaped testimony over strenuous ob-
12. Barker, 761 F.2d at 1398.
13. Id.
14. See People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1974).
15. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
16. 761 F.2d at 1398.
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jections by Barker's counsel both before and at trial. The playing of the
videotape occupied over two and one-half days of the eight day trial.
Green, Moran, and Pifer Jr. also testified. 17 At the trial's conclusion,
Barker was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and first degree mur-
der.18 His murder conviction was based on a jury finding that he ordered
the killing.19
B. Procedural History
Barker appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal,
which filed two unpublished opinions within a month of each other.20 In
the first opinion, the court found that although Pifer's videotape was
inadmissible hearsay and should not have been allowed at Barker's trial,
its admission constituted harmless error. The court held that the Con-
frontation Clause was not violated under either federal or state standards
because Pifer's testimony was sufficiently reliable.21 One month later, in
response to a conflict within the district, the court revised the opinion in
a second unpublished opinion.22 This time the court held that the admis-
sion of the videotape did violate the Confrontation Clause because the
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Pifer. The court again
held that the admission of the tape constituted harmless error.23
Barker then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California, alleging that the trial court's admis-
sion of the videotape violated the Confrontation Clause. The District
Court denied the writ, claiming that there had been no violation of
17. Green was granted immunity and never tried. People v. Green, 1 Crim. 14,513 slip.
op. at 735 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). The court in Barker, however, stated that Green was in fact
tried. 761 F.2d. at 1398.
18. 761 F.2d at 1397.
19. This point is crucial in determining the effect on the jury of Pifer's videotaped testi-
mony because much of the cross-examination conducted by Moran and his co-defendants fo-
cused on Barker's alleged power over other members of the gang. See. e.g., Transcript of
Preliminary Examination of William Joseph Pifer, People v. Green, Municipal Court of the
West Judical District County of Contra Costa County, Nos. C 23691 to C 23694, at 228-30
(Nov. 27, 1972) [hereinafter Videotape Testimony of W. Pifer]. However, the Ninth Circuit
avoided this question in its discussion on whether the cross-examination by Moran's attorney
attempted to shift the blame to Barker. See infra notes 152-151 and accompanying text.
While Pifer refused to say that Barker committed the actual killing, he constantly referred to
Barker's authority and the fear he inspired in other group members. Videotape Testimony of
W. Pifer, supra, at 228-30.
20. The Ninth Circuit described the California Court of Appeal decisions as "state habeas
proceeding[s]." 761 F.2d at 1398. In fact, the case reached the Court of Appeal on a direct
appeal. People v. Barker, 1 Crim. 14,513, slip op. (1st App. Dist. Cal. 1976).
21. People v. Barker, 1 Crim. 14,513, slip op. at 6 (1st App. Dist. Cal. 1976).
22. Id.
23. Id. The California Supreme Court declined to grant a hearing.
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Barker's confrontation right.24
C. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Kennedy, af-
firmed the District Court's denial of Barker's writ. The court held that
the need for the testimony, and the particular guarantees of trustworthi-
ness attached to it, justified admission of the videotape and assured com-
pliance with the Confrontation Clause.25 The court determined that Ohio
v. Roberts sanctioned admission of reliable prior testimony by an unavail-
able witness regardless of whether the prior testimony had been subject
to cross-examination.26
The Barker court's analysis illustrates the confusion generated by
the test articulated in Roberts. Because the Roberts Court failed to define
"reliability," lower courts have been free to choose factors that will sup-
port the result they prefer. This failure has produced an inconsistent
body of case law, and encourages "result-oriented" decisionmaking.2 1
The question that remains unanswered, despite frequent consideration by
the Supreme Court, concerns the boundary between confrontation as a
constitutionally vindicated personal right, and the evidentiary rules and
procedures-especially the hearsay rules-designed to assist in the
court's factfinding task. Because improved factfinding serves the crimi-
nal defendant's interest by reducing the risk that damaging inaccuracies
will be admitted into evidence, the goals of the Confrontation Clause and
the evidence rules clearly overlap. A tendency to oversimplify this ap-
parent alliance of interests between the defendant and the judiciary, how-
24. Barker v. Morris, No. C 801867 SW, slip op. (N.D. Cal. 1982). The court applied the
Roberts test. See infra notes 131-138 and accompanying text. After finding that the witness,
Pifer, was unavailable, the court determined that his testimony was reliable and did not violate
Barker's right of confrontation. The court noted that while there is no single test for determin-
ing the reliability of hearsay testimony, the focus of the inquiry should be (1) whether there is
any corroborating evidence, and (2) whether, in light of the circumstances, the jury is able to
judge the declarant's credibility and veracity. Barker, supra, at 9. The court then applied
factors elaborated upon by "other courts" and found that Pifer's testimony was sufficiently
reliable. Id. at 14. The court failed to cite the "other courts;" however, the specific factors
relating to reliability were almost identical to those the plurality used in Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970). See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text. The court also found that vide-
otaping the testimony further assured its reliability. Barker, supra, at 13.
In explaining its finding of reliability the court asserted that "the accused's interest in
actual in-court confrontation must be balanced against competing public interests such as ef-
fective law enforcement and other similar policies." Id. at 6. The court did not address the
question of how the public interest in effective law enforcement would bolster the reliability of
Pifer's testimony. Furthermore, the court used this "public interest balancing" without
support.
25. Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 814 (1986).
26. Id. at 1399 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (1980); United States v. West, 574
F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1978).
27. See infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
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ever, can mislead judges into concluding that the defendant's entire
confrontation right interests are safeguarded simply by determining that
the evidence is reliable.
The flaw in this reasoning is fundamental. In an adversary system,
reliability is assured by confrontation. To determine reliability on
grounds other than that of confrontation, and to then conclude that the
benefits accruing from confrontation are present because of this reliabil-
ity, is clearly a circular argument. The history of the confrontation right
suggests that it allows the criminal defendant to participate directly in
the process by which facially reliable evidence is exposed as unreliable.
To replace the defendant's substantive role with the judge's subjective
rule of law undermines the adversary system precisely at the point when
the criminal defendant relies on it to preserve his own fair treatment at
the hands of the law.
II. The Evolution of the Confrontation Clause
Commentators have long speculated on the origins of the confronta-
tion guarantee.28 While the concept dates back to biblical times,29 at
common-law the right to confrontation was rarely enforced. The trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh typified the way in which confrontation was denied to
criminal defendants.30
Raleigh was accused of treason for conspiring to unseat the King of
England and to install Arabella Stuart in his place. The primary evi-
dence supporting Raleigh's conviction was the confession of Lord Cob-
ham, an alleged co-conspirator. His confession had been obtained by
torture,31 and was apparently recanted in a letter to Raleigh. At his trial,
Raleigh protested bitterly that the reading of Cobham's confession into
evidence was improper. He was unable to sway the court, however, and
was convicted of high treason and executed.32
Raleigh's case, along with a series of similar seventeenth and eight-
eenth century English cases, motivated the Framers of the United States
28. See, e.g., Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Ra-
leigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972); Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its
History and Modern Dress, 8 J. OF PUB. L. 381 (1959).
29. See Pollitt, supra note 28, at 384.
30. See 2 T. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 1 (1809).
31. Today, coercion to obtain a confession would violate the due process clause require-
ment of voluntariness. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 0960). The Court's primary con-
cern in Blackburn was that a compelled statement would be wholly unreliable. See also Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32. Raleigh pleaded to the court in desperation, "If there be but a trial of 5 marks at
Common Law, a witness must be deposed. Good my lords, let my Accuser come face to face,
and be deposed." 2 T. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 19. He also stated, "The Proof of the
Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser
before my face, and I have done." Id. at 15-16.
Constitution to include the confrontation guarantee in the Bill of Rights.
The Framers believed that this guarantee would prevent a criminal de-
fendant from being convicted on the basis of hearsay.3 Although they
did not phrase the guarantee as a specific right of cross-examination, the
use of the term "confrontation" encompasses cross-examination as a
matter of course.3 4
A. Confrontation as a Right of Cross-Examination
Four cases exemplify the Supreme Court's determination that, ex-
cept in limited circumstances, the Confrontation Clause guarantees a
criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.35 In Pointer v. Texas,36 the first case to rule that the Con-
frontation Clause was obligatory upon the states,3 7 the Court held that
"it can not be seriously doubted... that the right of cross-examination is
included in.. ." the sixth amendment right to confrontation, which is a
fundamental right essential to fair trial.38
In Pointer's companion case, Douglas v. Alabama, 39 the Court reiter-
ated its holding in Pointer. The Douglas Court stressed that the right to
confrontation required an "opportunity for thorough cross-examina-
tion."' The Court's opinion by Justice Brennan stressed that "a primary
33. See, eg., F. HELLER, supra note 2, at 104 (1961); see also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 1395.
34. When the Constitution was put before the states for ratification, Abraham Holmes, a
delegate from Massachusetts, objected to its passage claiming that it failed to guarantee a fair
trial:
The mode of trial is altogether undetermined-whether the criminal is to be allowed
the benefit of counsel; whether he is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to face;
whether he is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantage of
cross-examination, we are not yet told.
2 J. ELLIOT, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 110-11
(1881).
35. See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
36. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
37. By making the Confrontation Clause apply to the states, the Supreme Court opened
the door to a greater number of appeals in federal court based upon the Confrontation Clause.
Hearsay exceptions in state evidence codes were much broader than those recognized by the
federal courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-23 (M. Bender 1985).
38. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 404.
39. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
40. Two defendants, Douglas and Loyd, were tried separately in state court on charges of
assault with intent to murder. Loyd was tried first and found guilty. The prosecutor at Doug-
las' trial called Loyd as a witness. Loyd invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and
refused to answer any questions. The trial judge granted a prosecution motion to have Loyd
declared a hostile witness, thereby allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine Loyd. The prose-
cutor produced a document said to be a confession signed by Loyd. "Under the guise of cross-
examination to refresh Loyd's recollection, the [prosecutor] purported to read from the docu-
ment, pausing after every few sentences to ask Loyd, in the presence of the jury, 'Did you
Summer 19871 CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
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interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-exami-
nation."41 The Court further emphasized the importance of the confron-
tation right in allowing a defendant an opportunity to fully develop the
facts by testing and challenging the reliability and veracity of the prose-
cution's witnesses.42
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Bruton v. United States.43 The
Court reversed a federal conviction on confrontation grounds, noting
that "the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused
in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him."" All the jus-
tices on the Court agreed that a fair trial requires that the trial court
permit the criminal defendant to fully develop the facts. Further, all the
justices agreed that cross-examination is indispensable to this end.45
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided California v. Green.46 The ma-
jority opinion focused on whether out-of-court testimony admitted under
Section 1235 of the California Evidence Code47 violated the defendant's
right of confrontation. The testimony had been given by Porter, a six-
teen-year old boy, at the defendant Green's preliminary hearing. At
Green's trial, Porter attempted to recant his prior testimony, claiming he
could not remember the events in question because he had been under
the influence of drugs at the time.48 The prosecutor then read excerpts
make that statement?"' Id. at 416. Although Loyd continued to assert the privilege, the pros-
ecutor continued until the whole statement was read. Douglas argued that this violated his
confrontation rights. The trial judge refused to strike the statement and a jury found Douglas
guilty. Id.
41. 380 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added). The "petitioner's inability to cross-examine Loyd
as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause." Id. at 419 (emphasis added). The Court also cited Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), noting the importance of cross-examination for testing the mem-
ory and conscience of the witness as well as compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Id. at 242-43.
42. In Barker, the defendant never had a chance to cross-examine the unavailable declar-
ant to develop the facts as they applied to him. See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
43. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The facts of Bruton are analogous to those of Douglas; however,
in Bruton there was a joint trial of Bruton and a co-defendant, Evans, for armed postal rob-
bery. Evans did not take the stand, but a postal inspector testified that Evans orally confessed
to committing the robbery with Bruton. The trial court instructed the jury that the confession
was admissible against Evans but not Bruton, and that it should not be considered in judging
Bruton. Bruton was convicted and appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, stat-
ing that the trial judge's limiting instruction was sufficient protection for Bruton.
44. Id. at 126 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404).
45. Id. at 138.
46. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1982) provides in part: "[E]vidence of a statement
made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent
with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770." Section 770
provides that a witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 770 (West 1982).
48. 399 U.S. at 152.
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from Porter's prior testimony. This testimony was admitted by the trial
judge both for impeachment purposes and for "the truth of the matter
contained therein" pursuant to Section 1235.49
The Supreme Court held that admitting a declarant's out-of-court
statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the de-
clarant testifies at trial and is subject to full cross-examination.50 The
Court noted that "neither evidence nor reason convinces us that contem-
poraneous cross-examination before the ultimate trier of fact is so much
more effective than subsequent examination that it must be made the
touchstone of the Confrontation Clause."51
In Green, unlike its approach in Porter, Douglas, and Bruton, the
Court attempted to define what satisfies the Confrontation Clause rather
than what violates it. The Green Court stressed that the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied if a defendant is given the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine a hearsay declarant at some point after the declarant has made the
hearsay statement.
52
The Court also attempted to distinguish between the objectives of
the Confrontation Clause and of the rules of hearsay. The Confrontation
Clause, the Court explained, protects criminal defendants from being
convicted on evidence consisting of ex parte affidavits53 or depositions
secured by the prosecution.54 The hearsay rules and exceptions serve to
insure that out-of-court testimony will meet appropriate standards of re-
liability. The Court stated that reliability requirements of the hearsay
rules are an evidentiary means of protecting the defendant from inaccu-
49. Id. at 154. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed Green's conviction,
holding that allowing the prosecutor to use Porter's prior statements for the truth of their
content violated Green's confrontation right. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422,
75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969). The California court reasoned that although Porter's statements had
been subjected to cross examination by Green's counsel at a prior hearing, the defendant's
cross examination at trial "is not an adequate substitute for the right to cross examination
contemporaneous with the original testimony before a different tribunal." Id. at 659. The
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the California Supreme Court and
remanded the issue. 399 U.S. 149, 170 (1970).
The use of prior testimony in Green must be distinguished from use of former testimony
where the witness is unavailable. The latter is an acceptable hearsay exception. See, e.g., FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (1985); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1290-1292 (West 1982).
50. 399 U.S. at 161.
51. Id. The Court also noted that in Green, even in the absence of full cross-examination
at trial, the admission into evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony would have been
constitutional. Porter's prior statements were made under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion at the time they were made; Porter's failure to testify at Green's trial was not due to any
impropriety on the part of the state. Although the Court did not state the grounds for admit-
ting Porter's prior statement, it appears that the testimony would be admissible under the
"former testimony" exception contained in the Federal and California Evidence Codes. See
FED. R. EVID. (804)(b)(1) (1985); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1290-1292 (West 1982).
52. 399 U.S. at 158.
53. Id. at 156.
54. Id. See also F. HELLER, supra note 2, at 104.
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rate out of court statements." The Confrontation Clause enables the de-
fendant to expose prejudicial inaccuracies in statements made in and out
of court. Although these interests are similar, they are not coextensive. 56
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan illustrated that the Confrontation
Clause has a broader reach than the hearsay rules and suggested a work-
able approach to confrontation clause issues.5 His opinion began by ex-
amining why the Framers included the confrontation guarantee in the
Sixth Amendment. His historical analysis, however, was ultimately in-
conclusive. "The Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment.
History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause."58  Consequently, Justice
Harlan implied that the Court has considerable leeway to formulate a
practical approach to deciding confrontation clause issues.59
According to Justice Harlan, the Confrontation Clause requires the
prosecution to produce every "available" witness at trial.6 0 If the witness
is "available," then the use of hearsay is forbidden by the Confrontation
Clause regardless of whether the statement falls within an exception to
the hearsay rule.6" If the witness is unavailable, then Justice Harlan
would apply a "quasi due process" analysis62 to determine the admissibil-
ity of the hearsay statement. That is, if the out-of-court statement is suf-
ficiently reliable, then it would be admissible at trial.63
Justice Harlan's approach creates a preference for live testimony.
When live testimony is presented, the Confrontation Clause mandates
cross-examination of the witness. However, when the prosecution can
show that a witness is unavailable,' hearsay falling within an exception
55. 399 U.S. at 154. See also, 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1420-1422.
56. 399 U.S. at 155. "Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we
have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception." Id. at 155-56.
57. Id. at 172 (Harlan J., concurring).
58. Id. at 173-74 (Harlan J., concurring)
59. Id. at 173 (Harlan J., concurring).
60. Id. at 186-87 (Harlan J., concurring). Justice Harlan considers that the Confrontation
Clause and the Due Process Clause dictate this requirement. See id. at 186 n.20. However,
according to Justice Harlan, a witness who is present at trial but cannot recall prior testimony
is "available," thereby making the hearsay evidence inadmissible. Id. at 188. "To the extent
that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts
... I think confrontation is nonetheless satisfied." Id.
61. Id. at 186 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 186 n.20 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 189. This theory became the basis for the Court's opinion in Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text. Justice Harlan repudi-
ated this approach six months later in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
64. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 defines unavailability in the following manner:
Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant (1) is exempted
by a ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the
subject matter of his statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the
subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies
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would be admissible, provided it is sufficiently reliable.65 This approach,
while not controlling at the time of the Green opinion, motivated the
Court to reassess the right of confrontation in relation to the rules of
hearsay.
B. Dutton and Beyond: The Weakening of the Right of Cross-
Examination
Until Dutton v. Evans,66 confrontation clause decisions relied on the
premise that a defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses at some point before or during his trial.67 In Dutton, however,
the Court moved away from this requirement. While Dutton appears to
be an anomaly in confrontation clause analysis,6 8 it is important because
lower courts have relied on it extensively.69
In Dutton, Evans, Williams, and Truett were charged with murder
in the shootings of three Georgia police officers.70 Truett was granted
immunity after agreeing to testify against Evans and Williams in separate
trials. Williams was tried first, was found guilty of murder and refused
to testify at Evans' trial. During Evans' trial, one of the twenty prosecu-
tion witnesses, a fellow prisoner of Williams named Shaw, testified that
when Williams was brought back to the penitentiary after arraignment,
he asked Williams what had happened in court. Williams, according to
Shaw, responded: "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."7 1 Evans' counsel objected to the
admission of Shaw's testimony on the ground that it was hearsay and
thus violated Evans' confrontation right. The trial judge overruled the
to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or (4) is unable to be
present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by pro-
cess or other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the pro-
curement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying."
65. 399 U.S. at 189.
66. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
67. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
68. As a plurality opinion, Dutton's precedential value would appear limited. The plural-
ity opinion by Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and
Blackmun. Justice Harlan concurred with the result on different grounds. 400 U.S. at 93
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall dissented and was joined by Justices Black, Douglas
and Brennan. 400 U.S. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-27, 800-28 n.27 (M.
Bender 1985) and discussion infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text. In many cases citing
Dutton, the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at some point. See,
e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
70. 400 U.S. at 76.
71. Id. at 77.
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objection and Evans' counsel cross-examined Shaw. 2
The Dutton Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the reliability of
the hearsay testimony was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause
despite the fact that the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant, Williams.13 The Court indicated four factors to consider
in determining when an out of court statement, not subject to cross-ex-
amination, can be admitted at trial without violating a defendant's right
of confrontation: (1) whether the statement contains an assertion of past
fact; (2) whether the declarant was speaking from personal knowledge;
(3) whether the statement was founded on possibly faulty recollection;
and (4) whether the circumstances under which the statement was made
indicate its reliability. 4 Applying these factors, the Court first found
that Shaw's testimony did not contain a statement about past fact. Sec-
ond, the declarant's personal knowledge of the identity of the other par-
ticipants in the murder was corroborated by Truett's testimony and by
Williams' prior conviction.75 Third, it was unlikely that Williams' state-
ment was a product of Shaw's faulty recollection. Finally, the circum-
stances surrounding Williams' statement made it doubtful that Williams
misrepresented Evans' involvement.
The plurality also stressed that the statements were against Wil-
liams' penal interest, further ensuring their reliability. 6 The Court, how-
ever, relied completely on the hearsay rules to construct a confrontation
clause test:77 the statement was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Con-
frontation Clause because it was a spontaneous statement and also a dec-
laration against interest, two exceptions to the hearsay rule adopted by
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 ' The plurality also relied
on a "quasi-harmless error" approach:79 the statement, taken together
72. The trial judge correctly overruled Evans' objection under Georgia's co-conspirator
rule which allowed the admission of declarations made after the termination of the conspiracy,
but while still in the concealment stage. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954).
73. 400 U.S. at 88. The Court further stated that "the possibility that cross-examination
of Williams could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though made, might
have been unreliable was wholly unreal." Id. at 89.
74. Id. at 88-89.
75. Justice Stewart noted that cross-examination could not have shown that the hearsay
declarant did not have personal knowledge of the event. Id. at 88. But see 400 U.S. at 100
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting Justice Stewart's findings).
76. Justice Stewart noted that "[The] statement was spontaneous, and it was against his
penal interest to make it. These are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as
determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no con-
frontation of the declarant." 400 U.S. at 89.
77. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (1985).
78. FED. R. EVID. 803(2), 804(b)(3) (1985).
79. "Harmless error" refers to a trial court's erroneous ruling which, in the appellate
court's view, had no bearing on the outcome of the trial. Harmless error does not constitute
grounds for reversal.
with the testimony of the nineteen other witnesses,80 was neither "cru-
cial" nor "devastating. 8 1
By affirming the admission of the hearsay declaration without any
cross-examination, four justices abandoned the Court's long-established
position that cross-examination is synonymous with the right of confron-
tation. 2 The Court, however, made no attempt to reconcile its opinion
with those of Pointer, Douglas and Bruton. While some commentators
contend that Dutton was primarily a harmless error case, the plurality's
failure to rest the case on that basis has created a great deal of
confusion. 3
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but disagreed with the
Court's reliance on the Confrontation Clause to determine the admissi-
bility of hearsay evidence.8 4 Expressly repudiating his position in
Green,"5 Justice Harlan asserted that the Confrontation Clause merely
prescribes the procedure to be followed once evidence has been admitted,
but does not control what shall be admitted. 6
80. Professor Natali takes the view that the Court "permitted the harmless error tail to
wag the sixth amendment dog." Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search
of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 50-51 (1975).
81. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87.
82. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text. The plurality, in fact, expressly re-
jected that proposition:
"ITihe decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials by assuring that the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'"
Id. at 89 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161). By sanctioning the admission of the uncross-ex-
amined hearsay, the plurality implied that cross-examination is not required to assure the relia-
bility of the testimony.
83. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, but believed that the testimony constituted
harmless error and that the case should have been decided on that ground. 400 U.S. at 90
(Blackmun J., concurring).
84. 400 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 95. (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan cites Wigmore for this proposition:
The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying dec-
larations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially,-this depends on the law of Evi-
dence for the time being-but only what mode of procedure shall be followed-i.e. a
cross-examining procedure-in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordi-
nary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially.
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). In Justice Harlan's
view, whether the admission of hearsay falling under an exception violates the Sixth Amend-
ment should be determined "under the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' com-
mands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due
process of law. "Id. at 96-97. This view was the basis for Professor Baker's approach to con-
frontation and hearsay clashes. See Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules,
and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials,
6 CONN. L. REv. 529 (1974). See infra notes 166-172 and accompanying text. The Confronta-
tion Clause was not intended to control the scope of the rules of evidence, nor were the rules of
hearsay intended to be subservient to the Confrontation Clause. 400 U.S. at 95 (Harlan, J.,
Summer 19871 CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In his dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the plurality for retreating
from the long line of cases equating confrontation and cross-examina-
tion.87 Justice Marshall attacked the plurality's premise that cross-exami-
nation would not have changed the picture presented by Shaw's hearsay
testimony.8 He also criticized the plurality's reliability analysis. Ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, the plurality's rationale, in effect, permits
the hearsay rules and exceptions to subsume the Confrontation Clause. 89
Although Dutton signaled the first significant retreat from the
Court's insistence on cross-examination as the guarantee of confronta-
tion, the Court clearly reasserted the importance of cross-examination in
protecting the right of confrontation three years later in Chambers v.
Mississippi.90
The Supreme Court reversed a state court conviction, finding that
several evidentiary rulings by the trial court denied Chambers due pro-
cess.91 The Court held that the "voucher" rule-a common law rule
which prohibits a party from impeaching his or her own witness9 2 -as
applied by the trial court, denied Chambers the opportunity to cross-
examine an adverse witness, thereby violating the Confrontation
concurring). Justice Harlan's approach, while purporting to put the Confrontation Clause in
its proper place, calls into question a criminal defendant's constitutional right to fully develop
and present the facts of the case, because Justice Harlan viewed the Confrontation Clause as a
guarantee of cross-examination only when the witness is present.
87. 400 U.S. at 100-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined by Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan. "The teaching of this line of cases seems clear: absent the op-
portunity for cross-examination, testimony about the incriminating and implicating statement
allegedly made by Williams was constitutionally inadmissible in the trial of Evans." Id.
88. Id. "A trial lawyer might well doubt, as an article of the skeptical faith of that profes-
sion, such a categorical prophecy about the likely results of careful cross-examination." Id.
This same argument can be made on the part of the defendant in Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
89. 400 U.S. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting): "I believe the Confrontation Clause has
been sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an indicium of a probative likelihood can come
in, no matter how damaging the statement may be or how great the need for the truth-discov-
ering test of cross-examination." Id.
90. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
After Chambers' arrest for murder, a man named McDonald confessed to the crime in
writing. McDonald later repudiated this confession. Chambers called McDonald as a witness
in his state court trial after the prosecution refused to call McDonald. Although McDonald
admitted making the confession, the court refused to allow Chambers to impeach his own
witness regarding the repudiation. The court's action reflected Mississippi's adherence to the
common law "voucher" rule, which prohibits a party from impeaching its own witness. The
court also denied Chambers' request to have McDonald declared an adverse witness, which
would have given Chambers the right to cross-examine McDonald. Chambers was convicted
of murder. Id.
91. Id. at 302.
92. See supra note 90.
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Clause. 93 The Court noted that "[tihe right of cross-examination is more
than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation.... It is, indeed, 'an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
tional goal.' "91 Chambers thus casts doubt on the validity of Dutton.95
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Alaska.96 Davis ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the trial court's restriction of the scope of
cross-examination by the defendant.97 In an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Confronta-
tion Clause guarantees a defendant the fullest possible scope of cross-
examination.98 The Chief Justice noted that "the exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the consti-
tutionally protected right of cross-examination." 99 Thus despite Dutton,
the Davis Court found that satisfaction of the Confrontation Clause re-
quires cross-examination.
C. Ohio v. Roberts: Reliability-The New Confrontation Requirement
In 1980, the Court in Ohio v. Roberts"°c again considered the rela-
tionship between the Confrontation Clause and the rules of hearsay. The
case involved an Ohio criminal prosecution. Roberts was charged with
forging a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and with possession of a
stolen credit card belonging to Isaacs. At Roberts' preliminary hearing,
93. Id. at 298. The Court did not have to decide whether this error alone would have
mandated reversal. Taken together, this and other errors of the trial court were held to consti-
tute a denial of due process.
94. Id. at 295 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)) (emphasis added).
95. However, Dutton has been cited frequently by the Courts of Appeals in deciding con-
frontation clause issues. See infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text. This is particularly
true when hearsay not subject to cross-examination has been admitted. See, eg., United States
v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Snow, 520 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). Justice Stewart, the author of the plurality
opinion in Dutton, joined the majority in Chambers. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that
the Court did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Mississippi state court. Justice
Rehnquist also objected to "the Court's further constitutionalization of the intricacies of the
common law of evidence." 410 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
97. Id. at 318.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 316-17 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)). Justice Stewart,
in a brief concurrence, took a narrower view of the cross-examination prescribed by the Con-
stitution: "The Constitution [does not confer] a right in every case to impeach the general
credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or
criminal convictions." 415 U.S. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart did not ex-
plain his position. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, found no
constitutional issue. Id. (White, J., dissenting). In Justice White's view, the trial court has
discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination, and reviewing courts should not intervene
unless there is an abuse of discretion.
100. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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his counsel called only one witness, Isaacs' daughter Anita, who testified
that she knew Roberts and had allowed him to use her apartment on
occasion. Roberts' attorney questioned Anita at some length in an at-
tempt to show that she had given Roberts the check and credit card.
Anita denied this. Roberts' counsel never requested that the court de-
clare the witness hostile, nor did he seek permission to cross-examine
her. Roberts was thereafter indicted for forgery, receiving stolen prop-
erty and possession of heroin."'°
The prosecutor was unable to locate Anita at trial. Relying on an
Ohio statute which permits the use of preliminary hearing testimony
from an unavailable witness, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
offer Anita's earlier statements to rebut Roberts' claim that Anita had
given him her parents' checkbook and credit card.0 2 Roberts was con-
victed and appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the Confrontation Clause operates in two dis-
tinct ways to restrict the use of admissible hearsay. First, it establishes a
rule of necessity: 03 the prosecution must either produce the hearsay de-
clarant or demonstrate the declarant's unavailability. Second, if the wit-
ness is shown to be unavailable, the hearsay sought to be admitted must
possess sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause; ° "reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."' 0 5 In instances
where the evidence does not fall within a hearsay exception, it must be
excluded "at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."'
0 6
Roberts raises serious questions which the circuit courts have been
unable to resolve. First, the Court failed to define what constitutes a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception." ' 7 Second, when statements do not
fall within a firmly rooted exception, the Court would apply the same
standard for determining admissibility under the Confrontation Clause
101. Id. at 58.
102. OHIo R.EV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (1975) permits the use of preliminary examination
testimony of a witness who "cannot for any reason be produced at the trial. . .
103. 448 U.S. at 65.
104. Id. (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 108 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
105. Id. at 66. The Court noted that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance
of the constitutional protection.'" Id. (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)). Because the Court failed to state which exceptions would satisfy the reliability prong
of the test, lower courts have difficulty determining which hearsay exceptions are included.
See infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
106. 448 U.S. at 66. The Courts of Appeals are split as to how this language should be
interpreted. See infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
107. 448 U.S. at 66. See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
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as under the rules of hearsay.'" 8 Third, the Court failed to set forth pre-
cise guidelines for determining reliability under the second prong of
Roberts. 109
Numerous circuit court opinions have applied the Dutton factors
when determining reliability in this context. 01 While this approach is
questionable, the Roberts Court failed to specify circumstances, beyond
that of actual cross-examination, which indicate "reliability." 1"' Fur-
ther, by relying on cross-examination as the sole assurance of reliability,
the Court in Roberts created a presumption that when testimony does not
fall within a preciously sanctioned hearsay exception, nothing other than
cross-examination will suffice to assure reliability."1
2
No Supreme Court decision has sanctioned the use of an out-of-
court statement which had a "devastating" impact on a defendant unless
the statement was subject to the corrective test of cross-examination
either at a preliminary hearing or at a previous trial in which the defend-
ant took part. "3 Moreover, the Court has never permitted the admission
of hearsay that was not subject to cross-examination and is of question-
able reliability, based solely on the fact that the witness was
unavailable. 11
4
Although the Roberts decision sanctions a more flexible cross-exam-
ination standard than prior Supreme Court cases, the Court still prohib-
ited admission of a witness' testimony when the defendant had no
opportunity to conduct a meaningful cross-examination or its equivalent
and the testimony was crucial or devastating. However, as a result of the
uncertain standard promulgated by the Roberts Court, the circuit courts
108. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) (1985). In requiring "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness" under the Confrontation Clause, the Court left unclear whether this
standard should parallel the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" standard required
by the "catch-all" exceptions to the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The
circuit courts have been unable to distinguish between these standards. See e.g., United States
v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 965 n.10 (6th Cir. 1982), where the court, after searching for a
distinction, noted "the need for a comprehensive confrontation clause analysis which the
Supreme Court has been unable to articulate." Id.
109. The Court found the preliminary hearing testimony reliable, primarily because the
defendant "clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter ofform." 448 U.S. at 70 (empha-
sis in original).
110. See, eg., infra notes 118-127 and accompanying text.
111. Because the defendant in Roberts did have the opportunity to engage in the
"equivalent" of cross examination, the Roberts holding may be read quite narrowly.
112. This premise is further enhanced when the case is lined up with the Court's long-
standing equation of the Confrontation Clause and cross-examination.
113. See supra notes 31-99 and accompanying text.
114. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (defendant partook in the equivalent of cross-
examination); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (uncross-examined testimony was not cru-
cial or devastating); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
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have begun to allow admission of testimony which has not been cross-
examined and for which reliability is far from assured.
D. Inconsistent Circuit Court Applications of Ohio v. Roberts
The confusion generated by the Roberts decision is illustrated by
circuit court decisions analyzing confrontation clause challenges to evi-
dence admitted under the co-conspirator hearsay exception in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,115 and to admission of grand jury testimony at a
criminal trial when the declarant is unavailable. In deciding cases arising
under the co-conspirator exception, Rule 801(d)(2)(E), some circuits take
the approach that when testimony not subject to cross-examination
meets the criteria for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), its admis-
sion never violates the Confrontation Clause.1 6 These courts take the
position that rule 801(d)(2)(E) is a "firmly rooted hearsay exception,"
thus creating a presumption of reliability under Roberts. 17
Other circuits take the view that the admissibility requirements
under the co-conspirator exception and the Confrontation Clause are
not identical. These circuits examine each alleged confrontation clause
115. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (1985) provides: "(d) A statement is not hearsay if... (2)
The statement is offered against a party and is... (E) a statement by a co conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
116. See Sanson v. United States, 467 U.S. 1264, 1264-65 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
("The question presented in this case is whether statements that satisfy Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(2)(E) ... necessarily satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause ....
Because of the substantial confusion surrounding this frequently recurring issue I would grant
certiorari to resolve the conflict.").
Justices Marshall and Brennan would also like to see the Court reevaluate the Roberts
standard. However, since they would probably seek more protection for defendants under the
Confrontation Clause, and are in the minority on this position, they may be reluctant to push
for a review on the issue at this time. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 987 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983); United
States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983);
United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Lurz v. United
States, 459 U.S. 843 (1983); Magill v. United States, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United States v.
Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d. 269, 273
(1st Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973).
117. This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a state-
ment is not hearsay subject to an exception since it is defined as nonhearsay. FED. R. EvID
801(d) (1985). Second, admissibility of such statements is entirely discretionary and lends
itself to a result-oriented approach. In a Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Chinda Wongse, 771
F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 859 (1985), the court held that "evidence admitted
under... [the] 801(d)(2)(E) standard bears sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and 'guarantees of
trustworthiness' to satisfy the commands of the confrontation clause." Id. The court noted
that "the requirements of admissibility for out-of-court statements by unavailable co-conspira-
tors under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are identical to the requirements for admissibility under the con-
frontation clause." Id. at 847 (emphasis added). But see United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d
238, 254-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stillman v. United States, 464 U.S. 936 (1983)
(Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is not encompassed in the "hearsay exceptions" referred to in Roberts).
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violation on a case-by-case basis.I" In most of these decisions, the courts
use the Dutton factors to determine when the admission of hearsay will
not violate the Confrontation Clause." 9 Because the evaluation of these
factors is highly subjective, this approach again lends itself to result-ori-
ented outcomes.120
In the grand jury context, courts have also consistently relied on the
Dutton factors to uphold the admission at trial of grand jury testimony
that had not been subject to cross-examination.' 2 1 Only the Tenth Cir-
cuit bars the admission at trial of grand jury testimony by an unavailable
witness:122 because of the ex parte nature of testimony "secured through
a procedure that has become the arm of the examining magistrate,'" the
Tenth Circuit believes grand jury testimony is not reliable.' 23
Some circuits, when deciding the admissibility of prior grand jury
118. Sanson v. United States, 727 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984)
(White, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom Stillman v. United States, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United States v. Fahey,
769 F.2d 829, 839-40 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660-61 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917
(1979); United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976).
119. See eg., U.S. v. Perez, 658 F.2d at 661:
(1) [W]hether the declaration contained assertions of past fact;
(2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of the
participants in the crime;
(3) whether it was possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection;
and
(4) whether the circumstances under which the statements were made provided rea-
son to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in
the crime.
Id. (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.)
120. See supra note 117.
121. See, eg., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964-65 (6th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Garner,
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); United
States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
122. See United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980). The court determined that different standards must apply in determining the admissi-
bility of grand jury testimony under rule 804(b)(5) and the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 627.
The court stressed that the Confrontation Clause requires more than reliable evidence: the
purpose of the Clause is to regulate trial procedure by various means including cross-examina-
tion. Id. While recognizing that the Supreme Court has upheld the admission of uncross-
examined testimony in limited situations, the court referred to the long line of Supreme Court
decisions emphasizing cross-examination as the primary protection of confrontation values.
Id. at 628.
123. Id. at 627. The court was concerned that testimony of this type would favor the prose-
cution since the prosecutor could largely control the proceeding. See M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 99-102 (1977) (grand juries have
largely lost their function as protectors of individual rights and have become agents of the
prosecution).
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testimony, have routinely applied the two step approach of Roberts 124
and found that the admission at trial of testimony not subject to cross-
examination does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 25 These cir-
cuits, like those that follow the case-by-case approach for co-conspira-
tor's statements, generally rely on the Dutton factors to determine the
reliability of grand jury testimony.126
The inconsistent application of Roberts at the circuit court level has
created tremendous uncertainty in the law. Trial court judges find little
guidance when deciding whether to admit uncross-examined hearsay
that falls within an exception. Appellate courts reviewing the trial court
decisions also have no precise law to follow. While a "bright line" rule
might encourage consistent confrontation clause rulings, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to adopt such a rule. 127
1I. The Confrontation Clause and Barker v. Morris
Barker v. Morris128 further demonstrates the inconsistency gener-
ated by Roberts. Relying on Roberts, the Barker court concluded that
hearsay for which no exception applies can be reliable and thus admissi-
ble consistently with the Confrontation Clause.129
The Barker court noted that the Confrontation Clause permits the
introduction of hearsay when it is both necessary and reliable.13 The
124. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
125. In United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982), the Sixth Circuit applied the
Roberts two-step approach in deciding whether the admission at defendant's trial of grand jury
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. The court did not consider cross examination a
condition for admissibility under the Clause. Id. at 964 (citing United States v. West, 574 F.2d
1131 (4th Cir. 1978)). Assuming the unavailability requirement was met, the key question, in
the court's view, concerned the reliability of the statement. The court applied the four Dutton
factors and found the statement sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id. at
965. The court cited Dutton as "[t]he leadirg case in which the Supreme Court has permitted
the use of hearsay which was not previously cross-examined." Id. at 964. This reading of
Dutton is common among courts that apply Dutton factors as the sole determinant of reliability
for confrontation clause purposes. See supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text. However,
the holding in Dutton related ultimately to a harmless error question. The Seventh Circuit took
a similar approach in United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982).
126. See supra note 125.
127. The unique factual situations underlying confrontation clause cases probably contrib-
ute to this reluctance. The Court may prefer to allow trial judges broad discretion in deciding
what evidence should be admitted. A bright line rule would seriously limit this discretion.
For a thorough discussion of cases admitting grand jury testimony, see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-178 to 804-187 (1985); Comment, Constitutional Law,
supra note 4; Case Comment, supra note 9, at 703; Note, Admissibility of an Unavailable Wit-
ness' Grand Jury Testimony: Upholding the Purposes Behind the Confrontation Clause, 18 VAL.
U.L. Rnv. 965 (1984).
128. 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
129. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
130. 761 F.2d at 1399.
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court, proceeding under the two step approach in Roberts, first found
that the videotaped testimony was "necessary." '31 While necessity is
normally equated with unavailability of the witness,132 the Barker court
noted that the testimony was "necessary" because it was "qualitatively
different" from the testimony of other eyewitnesses; thus, the prosecution
"could have concluded that [it] was necessary to present the trier of fact
with a more complete and somewhat better balanced view of the evidence
...." ,133 This analysis reveals the court's misunderstanding of the first
prong of Roberts, which merely requires that the witness whose testi-
mony is sought to be admitted at trial be unavailable. 34 Moreover, this
line of reasoning is logically inconsistent with the court's later reliability
analysis, under which it found the testimony "reliable" in part because it
had been corroborated by in-court testimony.1 35 The court in essence
said that Pifer's testimony was necessary because it was different from
the other testimony presented at trial. However, the Court based the
reliability of the testimony on the fact that it was corroborated by other
testimony.
After finding that the testimony was necessary, the court concen-
trated on the second prong of Roberts-reliability. The court recognized
that although the testimony was analogous to testimony admitted under
several well-established hearsay exceptions-former testimony,"36 dying




134. The Roberts Court observed that the Confrontation Clause establishes a rule of neces-
sity: "the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability, of the declarant
whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U.S. at 65. Nowhere in Roberts
does the Court equate "necessity" with the notion that the testimony is required to "present
the trier of fact with a more complete and somewhat better balanced view of the evidence
... ." Barker, 761 F.2d at 1399.
135. 761 F.2d at 1401.
136. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (1985). This rule provides: "The following [is] not excluded
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: Testimony given as a witness at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination."
137. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (1985). This rule provides: "In a prosecution for homicide
or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his
impending death" will not be excluded by the hearsay rule where the declarent is "unavaila-
ble" to testify.
138. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (1985). This rule provides: "A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against
another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
Summer 1987]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." 139 The court then considered
whether the testimony contained specific guarantees of trustworthiness.
The court observed that the statement probably would have been
admitted in federal court as a co-conspirator's statement. 14° The testi-
mony was offered as evidence of a material fact, and "because of the
qualitative differences between [Pifer's] testimony and that of Green and
Moran it was more probative on the points for which offered than was
the other testimony." 141 This reasoning is quite similar to that underly-
ing the Dutton approach, and illustrates the court's conclusory approach
in determining reliability. The effect of this type of analysis is to relegate
the Confrontation Clause to the status of an evidentiary rule, because no
distinction is made between Rule 804(b)(5)'s "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" standard and the Roberts "particular guarantees of
trustworthiness" standard. 42
The Barker court recognized that while both the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rules are concerned with guaranteeing trustwor-
thiness, they are not coextensive:
143
[E]vidence admissible under the evidentiary rules of a particular
jurisdiction does not necessarily meet the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause. Similarly, the admission of testimony in viola-
tion of [a state's evidence rules] does not of its own force constitute
a violation of the Confrontation Clause."4
However, the court's reliability analysis proceeded as if the admissibility
standards of the Confrontation Clause and Rule 804(b)(5) are the same.
Based on the court's analysis, the court should have said that evidence
admissible under the evidentiary rules of a particular jurisdiction will al-
most always meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, and tes-
timony in violation of evidentiary rules does not of its own force violate
the Confrontation Clause. Under Barker, a violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause occurs only when the defendant shows that the testimony has
no indicia of reliability. Moreover, the court will not consider the preju-
believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement" will not be excluded by the hearsay rule where
the declarent is "unavailable" to testify.
139. Whether these forms of hearsay exceptions are applicable to the situation in Barker is
questionable; however, the court, by referring to them, intimates that the testimony is reliable.
Not only does the hearsay fail to qualify as a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, it does not
come within any of the stated exceptions to the hearsay rule.
140. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (1985).
141. 761 F.2d at 1400.
142. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
143. 761 F.2d at 1400.
144. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970)).
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dicial impact of the testimony.14
The Barker court found that the absence of cross-examination dis-
tinguished Barker from Roberts and Green.'46 However, the court
stressed that "this [absence] is directly attributable to Barker's fugitive
status."'4 Assuming Barker was a fugitive, the distinction makes little
sense because the court found that the testimony was sufficiently "relia-
ble" so as not to violate the Confrontation Clause. Thus, under the
court's analysis, Barker's presence, or lack thereof, would actually be ir-
relevant. The court, however, implied that if Barker had been present,
but had not been permitted to cross-examine Pifer, the use of Pifer's testi-
mony at Barker's subsequent trial would have violated the Confrontation
Clause.
The court then determined that the videotaped testimony was suffi-
ciently reliable. The declarant had made the statement voluntarily while
under oath, and was subject to penalty of perjury. 148 The court also anal-
ogized the statement to a dying declaration' 4 9 and a statement against
interest, 5 ' and considered the corroborating testimony of Moran and
145. The Barker court only considered factors that showed reliability. It failed to consider,
in any depth, factors indicating that Pifer's testimony was seriously tainted, including the fact
that Barker's co-defendants had ample opportunity to shape Pifer's testimony in favor of them-
selves and against the absent Barker. The court's failure to consider this demonstrates its re-
sult-oriented approach to the case. See infra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
146. 761 F.2d at 1400.
147. Id. This is factually incorrect (People v. Barker, 1 Crim. 14,513, slip. op. at 1313 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1972)). Barker had left the state prior to the indictment and was never notified of
the pending proceedings. The Court stated that its "analysis of the admissibility of such testi-
mony against [Barker] might well be different from the analysis we offer below, 'if Barker had
not been a fugitive.' " 761 F.2d at 1400. The reliability of the testimony should not be affected
by the question of whether Barker was a fugitive. The fugitive issue only affects whether or not
Barker had the opportunity to cross-examine Pifer.
148. 761 F.2d at 1401. It is questionable whether Pifer, who had a long history of serious
criminal behavior, and who knew he only had a few weeks to live, would be concerned about a
perjury prosecution.
149. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. at 237, 244 (1895) ("the sense of im-
pending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood .... ")). The idea that dying
declarations are inherently reliable is not universally accepted. See, eg., Jaffee, The Constitu-
tion and Proof by Dead or Unconfrontable Declarants, 33 ARK. L. RPv. 227 (1979) (refuting
the inherent reliability of dying declarations); see also Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 814 (1986). The Federal Public Defender's petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court states that
the concept that a convicted felon who is an admitted dealer in hard narcotics, seek-
ing to avoid prosecution for accessory to murder, federal charges for blowing up a
truck to punish a drug customer and seeking to protect his son from prosecution will
tell the truth because his death is imminent and he fears the wrath of his creator is
naive to say the least.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Barker v. Morris, (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985) (No. 85-5481).
150. It is questionable whether the statements were against Pifer's interest because Pifer
and his son were both granted complete immunity. 761 F.2d at 1398.
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Green as a further assurance of reliability."' However, the court based
this part of the analysis only on corroboration of undisputed facts. The
facts relevant to Barker's complicity-showing that he ordered the kill-
ing-were not sufficiently corroborated.15
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the case is that the court found
Pifer's statements reliable in part because it felt that Barker's interests
were served by the cross-examination conducted by Moran and the other
defendants. 5 3 In finding that the cross-examination by other defense
counsel insured the reliability of the testimony, the court stated that
"whether such cross-examination provides a sufficient indication of relia-
bility turns upon whether the interests of those who were represented
during cross-examination were advanced in a manner that was consistent
with the interest of the defendant who lacked such representation."15 4
With this sweeping pronouncement, the Ninth Circuit both ex-
panded the law of hearsay and took a major bite out of the Confrontation
Clause. First, the court ignored the fact that, in criminal cases, both the
Federal and California Rules of Evidence prohibit the use of former testi-
mony when the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the de-
clarant."' Second, the court overlooked the very real possibility that the
cross-examination conducted by Moran and the other defendants might
151. As stated earlier, this is inconsistent with the court's finding that Pifer's testimony was
"necessary." See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. Furthermore, accomplice testi-
mony is of questionable reliability. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 1982) (a con-
viction cannot rest on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice). See also People v.
Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 544 P.2d 135, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976). The Barker court ac-
knowledged this as well, noting that "Green and Moran were accomplices and had a motive to
shift blame to Barker." 761 F.2d at 1398.
152. The only parts of Pifer's testimony that were corroborated were claims that Barker
was present the night of the killings and that the victims died. Neither Green nor Moran
testified that Barker ordered the killing. 761 F.2d at 1402. This fact is relevant when consid-
ering the court's "similarity of interest" rationale concerning Moran's usefulness to Barker and
the other defendants' cross-examination.
153. 761 F.2d at 1402. At the preliminary hearing for Moran and the other defendants,
Pifer was challenged on numerous grounds including his ability to accurately perceive, recall,
and communicate, as well as his motives and biases in testifying. The cross-examination
brought out Pifer's grant of immunity, various discrepancies between his current testimony
and prior statements, his failure to mention his son's presence on the night in question, his use
of drugs, his prior acts of misconduct, and animosity between himself and the Hell's Angels,
including Barker. Id.
154. Id.
155. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (1985). The hearsay exception for former testimony provides
that:
"Testimony given as a witness at a former hearing of the same or a different proceed-
ing, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a
civil proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
Id. (emphasis added). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291(a)(2) (West 1982). The advisory
notes to that section state:
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have been extremely damaging to Barker.156 The court summarily con-
cluded that the extensive cross-examination was aimed at discrediting
Pifer and that Pifer was not interested in shifting blame to Barker. 57
While recognizing that an inherent conflict of interest exists between
criminal defendants in the same proceeding, the court found that the jury
could determine whether Pifer's testimony was being shaped against
Barker. ' The court also noted that Pifer declined to attribute sole re-
sponsibility to Barker. Assuming this is correct,159 the fact remains that
Barker never had the opportunity to cross-examine the most damaging
witness against him, while attorneys for his potential co-defendants had
the opportunity to shape the testimony that was crucial in convicting
Barker. 6°
The court's findings regarding the content of the cross-examination
of Pifer raise serious questions. Many areas of Pifer's cross-examination
clearly were intended to focus blame for the homicides on Barker. It is
questionable whether the jury could discern these defense tactics utilized
at Barker's expense. The court's rationale overlooks a basic premise un-
derlying the Confrontation Clause: that the accused has a right to con-
front his accuser to protect his interests, not the adverse interests of his
co-defendant. Because of the inherent conflict between criminal defend-
ants in the same proceeding,161 cross-examination by co-defendants seek-
ing to shift primary responsibility to an absent defendant can only
present a distorted picture when later offered against that defendant.
By sanctioning the "similar interest" rationale in a criminal case, the
court in Barker created a new hearsay exception and then went on to
proclaim its constitutionality. While the rules of evidence are subject to
legislative change, the Confrontation Clause must function as the final
This limitation preserves the right of a person accused of a crime to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. When a person's life or liberty is at stake-
as it is in a criminal action-the defendant should not be compelled to rely on the fact
that another person has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1982) (advisory committee notes) (emphasis added); see gener-
ally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-96 to 804-97 (M. Bender
1985) (providing an overview of the conflicting arguments on this issue).
156. 761 F.2d at 1402.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1403. This finding by the court was highly conclusory and no rationale to
support it was offered, except for the fact that Barker's trial attorney informed the jury of the
potentially differing interests of the preliminary hearing defendants. The court also failed to
consider the tactical differences between cross-examination at a preliminary hearing and cross
examination at trial.
159. After Pifer testified that one of the victims had died, the prosecutor asked Pifer what
happened. Pifer replied "so Richard [Barker] came out and said, 'kill that son of a bitch. We
don't want no witnesses. That guy is dead.'" Videotape Testimony of W. Pifer, supra note 19,
at 66. Note that Barker's criminal responsibility was based on his having ordered the killing.
160. Barker and Moran were the only two of six defendants to be convicted of first degree
murder.
161. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
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protection against damaging hearsay not subject to cross-examination. 62
However, as Barker illustrates, lower courts since Ohio v. Roberts can, if
they so choose, eliminate confrontation clause considerations altogether
by finding that hearsay is reliable for confrontation clause purposes. The
unconfronted hearsay is then admissible even though no exception
applies.
The court in Barker also found that the videotape provided the jury
a chance to evaluate the witness' demeanor. The court considered video-
tape a valuable tool for evaluating the reliability of a declarant's earlier
testimony when necessity is demonstrated. 163 Although the impact of
videotape has been widely debated, the court failed to cite any authority
to support its assumption. Numerous commentators have argued that
videotape often gives a distorted picture. 1" Professor Raburn notes that
"the prejudicial weight of [videotaped] evidence due to the jury's emo-
tional reaction to the tape would be extremely difficult to counter. While
Courts may argue that tapes are mere moving pictures plus sound, tapes
have the potential of being far more prejudicial than mere words set on
paper." '65 The court's failure to address this serious possibility of preju-
dice demonstrates a lack of insight into the impact and use of this me-
dium. More importantly, it evidences a disturbing tendency by the
courts to reach far and wide to find uncross-examined hearsay testimony
reliable and hence admissible. Until the Supreme Court rethinks this is-
sue, lower courts will have free reign to make the law as they see fit in a
particular case.
IV. Proposals for Determining When Hearsay Will Not
Violate the Confrontation Clause
Commentators have proposed various methods for determining
when the use of hearsay will not violate the Confrontation Clause. For
example, Professor Baker proposed a due process check on the admission
162. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (declaring the Confrontation Clause funda-
mental and thereby binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
163. 761 F.2d at 1403.
164. Raburn, Videotapes in Criminal Courts, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 421 (1981). See also
Note, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. L. REv. 567
(1976); Brackel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.A.J. 956
(1975); Note, The Role of Videotape in the Criminal Court, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1107
(1976); Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1974);
Note, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, 9 COLUM. J.L. SoC. PROBS. 363
(1973); Doret, Trial by Videotape-Can Justice Be Seen to be Done?, 47 TEMP. L.Q 228
(1974); Miller & Fontes, Real Versus Reel: What's the Verdict: The Effect of Videotaped Court
Materials on Juror Response, NSF-RANN Grant Apr. 75-15815, Dept. of Communication,
Mich. State Univ. at 235-38.
165. Raburn, supra note 164.
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of uncross-examined hearsay. 166 If the state desires to use "crucial" or
"devastating" hearsay, the court should conduct a pretrial hearing to de-
termine admissibility.1 67 To justify admitting such testimony, the prose-
cutor must show that the declarant is unavailable and that the statement
is reliable.1 61 If the declarant is unavailable, and the statement falls
within a jurisdictional hearsay exception, the statement is presumed reli-
able and thus admissible.1 69 This presumption can be overcome if the
defendant produces evidence of the statement's unreliability or
prosecutorial misconduct. 1
70
Professor Baker's proposal is of limited use. First, it does not define
what the due process hearing should entail. There is no definition of
what evidence will justify admission or exclusion of testimony or what
amount of evidence is required for this purpose. Second, the presumption
of reliability for statements falling within a jurisdictional hearsay excep-
tion fails to resolve the inconsistency and uncertainty generated by Rob-
erts. Without a method for determining reliability, Professor Baker's
approach affords no protection under the Confrontation Clause in cases
where a state legislature or Congress may have enacted an overly broad
hearsay exception.1 7 1 Without a consistent standard, trial courts will
have little guidance in determining when the admission of unconfronted
hearsay violates the Clause.1 72
Professor Graham has also attempted to devise a standard for deter-
mining when the admission of unconfronted hearsay would not violate
the Confrontation Clause. 173 Graham contends that a trial court must
first determine whether the witness is a principal witness against the de-
fendant.174 For this purpose, he essentially adopts the "crucial or devas-
tating" approach of Dutton. 175 If the testimony sought to be introduced
is merely cumulative or inconsequential, it may be admitted without vio-
lating the Confrontation Clause and the witness need not be produced or
166. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules and Due Process---A Proposal
for Determining When Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CoNN. L. REv. 529 (1974).
167. Id. at 549.
168. Id. This requirement is essentially the same as in Roberts. See supra notes 103-105
and accompanying text.
169. Baker, supra rule 166, at 549. This "presumption" favoring reliability is narrower
than the "inference" of reliability referred to in Roberts for statements "falling within a well
rooted hearsay exception," id., but it too contemplates a wider range of exceptions.
170. Baker, supra note 166, at 549-50.
171. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (1985).
172. Under this proposal, Pifer's testimony would have been excluded at Barker's trial
because it did not fall under a hearsay exception recognized in California. See supra notes 20-
23 and accompanying text.
173. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
174. Id. at 129.
175. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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confronted. 17 6 If the witness is essential-that is, crucial or devastat-
ing-the defendant must have the opportunity to confront and cross-ex-
amine. 77 The impact of the profferred evidence must be analyzed in the
context of the case, not in the abstract. 
178
The strength of Graham's proposal is that it attempts to bar convic-
tions based solely on hearsay. However, its application presents practical
difficulties. It is unlikely that a judge could predict accurately whether a
jury would regard a particular piece of evidence as essential. Certain
evidence not essential on its face may acquire special significance when
considered in conjunction with other evidence and a party's theory of the
case. 179
Professor Natali has offered a third proposal to reconcile the hear-
say exceptions and the Confrontation Clause."' ° Natali noted that, irre-
spective of the rules of hearsay, the Confrontation Clause demands that
prior to the admission of any out-of-court statement, the declarant must
be in court and subject to cross-examination. The only exception is
where "substantial guarantees of trustworthiness are present which sat-
isfy the trial court that the defendant's confrontation rights are fully
compensated." '181 If the defendant can show that the statement was not
made voluntarily or was made under circumstances indicating another
party's control,182 it will not be admitted. Finally, uncross-examined
hearsay will not be admitted unless prima facie evidence is presented to
support a conviction against the defendant. 18 3
This proposal, while more precise than the others, still leaves serious
questions unanswered. Perhaps the biggest problem is in determining
what constitutes "substantial guarantees of trustworthiness." In his ex-
amples, Natali employs factors similar to those in Dutton. Since these
factors closely parallel the rationales underlying the hearsay exceptions,
Natali's proposal would in some respects make the Confrontation Clause
coextensive with the rules of hearsay. 184
The strength of Natali's proposal lies in his concern for "circum-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. This approach would apply regardless of which hearsay exception is used to justify the
admission of the declarant's testimony.
179. There is little question that under Graham's proposal, Pifer's testimony would not
have been admitted at Barker's trial. Pifer's testimony took two and one half days of the eight-
week long trial. Moreover, Green and Moran were both co-defendants and, as the Barker court
noted, had a motive to try and shift the blame to Barker.
180. Natali, Green, Dutton, and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RuT.-
CAM. L.J. 43 (1975).
181. Id. at 62.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 63.
184. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Natali's proposal would not solve one of
the main problems created by the Roberts decision: how to determine reliability.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
stances which indicate one party's control of the declarant."' 85 The
phrase "under another's control" could be read to include cross-exami-
nation by a party with a "similar" interest. This situation would always
violate the Confrontation Clause when the prior testimony does not come
within a hearsay exception. There is also the obvious possibility that such
"controlled" testimony will be biased. Ironically, in Barker, the court
found that cross-examination by non-parties made the testimony more
reliable.
If the Barker court had applied Natali's analysis, Pifer's videotape
testimony probably would have been excluded. Although the court
might have found the testimony sufficiently trustworthy, the other two
prongs of Natali's test would have disqualified the evidence. First, it is
doubtful that a prima facie case existed against Barker without Pifer's
testimony. 186 Second, Pifer's testimony was clearly shaped and con-
trolled by others."8 7 Thus, under Natali's approach, the testimony would
be inadmissable even though arguably reliable.
Although Natali's proposal still allows courts some room to engage
in subjective value judgments as to the reliability of proffered evidence, it
is considerably more precise than the vague test promulgated by the Rob-
erts Court. Natali's proposal would also require trial courts to articulate
their reasons for admitting testimony over confrontation clause objec-
tions, enabling appellate courts to review lower court decisions more ef-
fectively. Most importantly, this analysis distinguishes the
Confrontation Clause from the rules of hearsay by emphasizing primarily
the defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses to protect his or
her interests, as opposed to merely guaranteeing that admitted evidence
meets minimum standards of reliability.
Conclusion
The Confrontation Clause was included in the Constitution to force
an accuser to come face to face with the defendant in the courtroom and
to undergo cross-examination. A defendant may then protect his or her
interests by testing the accuser in front of the trier of fact. Any analysis
that does not achieve this result must be carefully scrutinized to ensure
that the sixth amendment right of confrontation has been satisfied.
The Supreme Court has long expressed the notion that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to cross-examine
the witnesses against him, except in extraordinary circumstances. In
Ohio v. Roberts, however, the Court left a confusing precedent with dan-
185. Natali, supra note 180, at 62.
186. Absent Pifers testimony, there would not have been a case against Barker. The only
corroborating testimony went to the fact that a killing occurred and Barker was present. 761
F.2d at 1402. See supra note 152.
187. See supra notes 153-161 and accompanying text.
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gerous implications for the confrontation right. While expressing a pref-
erence for cross-examination, the Court created an imprecise standard
for determining when testimony not subject to cross-examination may be
admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause. Because Roberts
failed to present clear guidelines for determining when out of court testi-
mony is sufficiently reliable under the Confrontation Clause, lower courts
may admit uncross-examined hearsay when it furthers a desired result.
On appeal, the admissibility question ultimately turns on a particular
court's sense of fairness.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Barker v. Morris demonstrates the
loose, subjective approach adopted by the federal circuit courts since
Ohio v. Roberts. The Barker court strained to find the testimony admit-
ted by the trial court sufficiently "reliable" to overcome the Confronta-
tion Clause's preference for cross-examination. The court found that
cross-examination of an accomplice by co-defendants, conducted at an
earlier hearing to which the defendant was not a party, satisfied the de-
fendant's confrontation right. This strained interpretation of Roberts
highlights the need for a precise standard under which confrontation is-
sues can be adjudicated.
Allowing courts to decide whether testimony is reliable, and hence
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, calls into question the integ-
rity of the judicial process itself. The Supreme Court should evaluate the
decisions applying Ohio v. Roberts, and rethink its confrontation clause
analysis. By continuing to allow decisions like Barker 1,. Morris and the
grand jury cases to stand untouched, the Court is shirking its responsibil-
ity to preserve both the integrity and the basic constitutional protections
of the criminal justice system.
By William S. Pitman*
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1983; J.D., Hastings College of the Law,
May 1987.
